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IS THIS BELT ONE SIZE FITS ALL?
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
John C. Byrnes*
ABSTRACT
Widely considered one of the largest and most ambitious infrastructure projects in human history,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] has made major headway since its inception in 2013.
Although the BRI is formally adopted under the Chinese Communist Party Constitution as an
initiative to secure “shared growth through discussion and collaboration,” the BRI is much more
than these words convey. This Comment briefly introduces an overview of the BRI, including its
components and early research on its effects on participating countries and regions. The Comment
then conducts an in-depth analysis of four countries who have participated in the BRI with varying
degrees of success. Next, the Comment discusses various international concerns surrounding the
BRI, including possible debt diplomacy and military motivations. Finally, the Comment concludes
that although the BRI should be applauded for its bold aspirations and developments, it should
also be closely monitored by the international community to mitigate any deleterious effects incurred
by BRI participants.

* John ‘Jack’ Byrnes is the Managing Editor of Student Works for the Penn
State Journal of Law & International Affairs and a 2020 J.D. Candidate at Penn State
Law.

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 725
OVERVIEW OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.................... 727
A. Components of the Belt and Road and China’s
Motivations ........................................................................... 727
B. Early Research on the Effects of the Belt and Road
Initiative ................................................................................ 730
AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF FOUR BELT AND ROAD
COUNTRIES ................................................................................... 734
A. The Good with some Bad: Kenya..................................... 734
B. Only the Bad: Sri Lanka & Malaysia ................................. 738
1. Sri Lanka.......................................................................... 738
2. Malaysia ........................................................................... 741
C. The Questionable: Montenegro......................................... 745
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVE .................................................................................... 749
CONCLUSION................................................................................ 754

724

2020

Is This Belt One Size Fits All?

8:2

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Silk Road, the ancient network of trade routes that
connected Eurasia and Africa, is heralded to this day as one of the most
significant examples of the early international exchange of goods and
ideas between different cultures and nations. The Silk Road of the
ancient world aided in the development of large cities along trade
routes, acted as a catalyst for international relations between far-away
nations, spread wealth and religion, and made the nomadic lifestyle of
our ancestors more and more unnecessary.
In today’s increasingly globalized and interconnected world,
trade between nations has become easier and more accessible than ever
Brook Larmer, What the World’s Emptiest International Airport Says About
China’s Influence, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 13, 2017); Illustration by Andrew
Rae, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/what-the-worlds-emptiestinternational-airport-says-about-chinas-influence.html.
1

725

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

before. However, some nations believe that there is more to be done
to promote international trade - one of these nations is China. In 2013,
China unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative, which would further its
desire to increase trade with other nations in the Middle East, Eurasia,
Africa, Southeast Asia, and even into the Western Hemisphere.2
Originally referred to as “One Belt, One Road,” China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (“BRI”), which Chinese President Xi Jinping has called the
“project of the century,” has entered into its sixth year of progress
towards creating a twenty-first century Silk Road for Chinese trade.3
China has promised to invest nearly $1 trillion in infrastructure to over
60 countries in Eurasia, Africa, and South-East Asia.4 Although these
infrastructure investments can be great for both aiding the trade
aspirations of China and the domestic needs of developing nations,
some experts are concerned that the large loans that these developing
and smaller nations are taking from China can end in unintended
consequences.
This comment will look to address the BRI in three parts. The
first part will provide an overview of how China has developed and
implemented the BRI; how it has impacted their economic and trade
policies; and how it is likely going to shape their approach to
international trade and affairs moving forward.
The second part will focus on how the BRI has impacted four
nations in particular: Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Montenegro.
Specifically, this section will focus on how the BRI brings with it both
positive and negative impacts and highlight how, depending on a
nation’s location and current economic condition, the risks of being
involved in the BRI can sometimes outweigh its potential benefits.
This part will also focus on how international legal bodies are looking
to regulate and monitor the BRI’s implementation in these nations.

2
David Tweed, China’s New Silk Road, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/china-s-silk-road.
3
Id.
4
See Jane Perlez and Yufan Huang, Behind China’s $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up
the
Economic
Order,
NEW
YORK
TIMES
(May
13,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-oneroad-1-trillion-plan.html.
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The third part will outline several concerns that the
international community has regarding China’s involvement in nations
participating in the BRI. These concerns include fears of predatory
lending, debt diplomacy, economic colonialism, and disguised military
expansionism.
This comment will then conclude by recommending a cautious
outlook on China’s BRI. While the BRI has much to offer to both
developed and developing nations who choose to participate in the
trade program—namely an increase in domestic prosperity —China’s
ultimate motivations and projected increased influence deserve to be
observed carefully by the international community.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
A. Components of the Belt and Road and China’s Motivations
It has been no secret that over the past three decades China
has made infrastructure development a top priority. China believes that
a top modern economy is only able to grow when it has ample roads,
railways, electricity, and telecommunications capabilities.5 To date, the
BRI consists primarily of two economic corridors. The Silk Road
Economic Belt links China to both Central and South Asia, and
Europe. The New Maritime Silk Road links China to South East Asia,
the Gulf Countries, North Africa, and Europe.6 However, the
Economic Belt is actually made up of six separate economic corridors.7
5
A 2013 McKinsey & Company study showed that between 1992-2011
China spent 8.2% of its GDP on infrastructure. This far exceeded what any other
country spent, including the United States and European Union, who each spent
2.6% of their GDP on infrastructure during the same period. See Yougang Chen,
Stefan Matzinger, and Jonathan Woetzel, Chinese Infrastructure: The Big Picture,
MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (June 15 2013), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/winning-in-emerging-markets/chinese-infrastructure-the-big-picture.
6
Belt and Road Initiative, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-roadinitiative#02.
7
In Northern China, the China-Mongolia-Russian Corridor runs from
Tianjin to Ulan-Ude in Siberia. In Southern China, the China-Indochina Peninsula
Corridor runs from the Pearl River Delta to Singapore, while the Bangladesh-ChinaMyanmar Corridor runs from Kunming to Kolkata. Western China has three
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Taken all together, these economic corridors comprise nearly 30% of
global GDP, 62% of the global population, and 75% of known energy
reserves.8 Through this massive global initiative, China is aspiring to
reshape global trade with itself as the epicenter.
In a 2013 speech delivered by President Xi Jinping titled
“Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future,”
Xi proposed what he called a “Silk Road Economic Belt.”9 Xi listed a
multitude of reasons for embarking on the process of developing this
twenty-first century Silk Road, including: strengthening policy
communication, improving road connectivity, promoting trade
facilitation, enhancing monetary circulation, and strengthening peopleto-people exchanges.10 Although these are all underlying motivations
for the BRI, infrastructure development is considered the central
motivation.
In 2008-09, due to the global financial crisis, China saw a
significant slowdown in GDP growth and adopted a so-called “4
trillion yuan stimulus package” that mainly focused on infrastructure
investments and projects.11 This focus on infrastructure development
was ultimately able to help carry China through the global financial
crisis. In an apparent parallel to this stimulus plan, it is the central role
played by infrastructure development and investment that separates
the BRI from other international cooperation endeavors.12 With this in
corridors, which include the China-Pakistan Corridor running between Kashgar to
Gwadar, the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor linking 5 Central Asian
countries and 17 West Asian countries, as well as the (6) New Eurasian Land Bridge
that starts in Jiangsu province, China, and ends in Antwerp, Brussels. See Embracing
the
BRI
Ecosystem
in
2018,
DELOITTE
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/asia-pacific/china-belt-androad-initiative.html.
8
Belt, supra note 6.
9
President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road
Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF
CHINA
(Sept.
7,
2013),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_6656
86/t1076334.shtml.
10
Id.
11
Yiping Huang, Understanding China’s Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation,
framework and assessment, 40 CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW 316 (2016).
12
Id. at 319.
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mind, many of the countries that China has brought into the BRI have
substantially under-invested in their own infrastructure. Therefore,
China is filling the need for global investment in infrastructure in
developing parts of the world.13 With a domestic surplus of steel,
cement and infrastructure machinery, China’s mostly State owned
enterprises, through the BRI, are looking toward developing countries
within the BRI’s geographic sphere to sustain their steady economic
growth.14
By investing in infrastructure projects set up through the BRI
in foreign nations, China is able to give its state-owned enterprises the
economic output it needs.15 Chinese companies are taking note of the
potential of the BRI for sheltering their overseas projects. Michael
Every, head of financial markets research for Rabobank Group in
Hong Kong eluded to this well-known notion amongst Chinese
companies, stating “Belt and Road is a political special sauce . . . if you
drizzle it on anything, it tastes better.”16
The effects of the BRI projects in Africa highlight the way the
program is designed to serve the interests of Chinese firms and people.
Of the 1,073 Chinese firms conducting business across eight African
nations, only 44% of the local managers for these enterprises are from
Africa.17 Additionally, only 47% of the Chinese firms’ sourcing was
from local African firms.18 Although the Chinese investment will
ultimately likely result in a strong net gain for these African nations,

Id. at 319. “In early 2014, the IMF called for more investment in
infrastructure around the world, as part of the efforts to stabilize economic growth.”
14
Perlez and Huang, supra note 4.
15
Id.
16
Bloomberg Marketing, China’s Empire of Money is Reshaping Global Trade,
BLOOMBERG, (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/markets/fixed-income.
17
Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram, and Omid Kassiri, Dance of the Lions and
Dragons – How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve?, MCKINSEY
&
COMPANY
(June
2017),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/Middle%20
East%20and%20Africa/The%20closest%20look%20yet%20at%20Chinese%20eco
nomic%20engagement%20in%20Africa/Dance-of-the-lions-and-dragons.ashx
18
Id.
13
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there are calls for more emphasis to be placed on local labor resources
for these projects.
In summarizing President Xi’s vision, Cao Wenlian, director
general of the International Cooperation Center of the National
Development and Reform Commission, a group dedicated to the
initiative, stated “President Xi believes this is a long-term plan that will
involve the current and future generations to propel Chinese and
global economic growth . . . the plan is to lead the new globalization
2.0.”19 Indeed, President Xi’s plan to have the BRI engrained in China’s
future has gone so far that, in October 2017, the BRI was officially
written into the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution. 20
As many nations watching the emergence of the BRI have
noted, China’s growing involvement with foreign nations may also be
pushed by political, and perhaps military, motivations – this will be
discussed later in this comment.
B. Early Research on the Effects of the Belt and Road Initiative
Although the BRI is in its early stages of development, studies
have already been published showing the current and potential changes
that can come along with the initiative. Whenever a country with a
robust economy, let alone one of the largest economies in the world
like China, institutes widespread change in how they trade and conduct
business with the rest of the world, the changes and effects are certain
to be widespread.
In terms of the early impact on trade costs and timing, there
are early signs for optimism for China. A 2018 study compiled data
from over 1,818 cities that are located in BRI economies and compared
them to a global database that contained over 1,000 cities in 191
countries.21 Overall, the findings of the analysis pointed towards
Perlez and Huang, supra note 4. .
Deloitte, supra note 7.
21
Francois De Soyres et al., How Much Will the Belt and Road Initiative Reduce
Trade
Costs?,
WORLD
BANK
GROUP
(Oct.
15,
2018),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/592771539630482582/pdf/WPS861
4.pdf.
19
20
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significantly reduced shipment times and trade costs due to the BRI.
Specifically, on a macro level, the world will see a reduction in
shipment time for goods that will range between 1.2 and 2.5 percent,
which will lead to a reduction of aggregate trade costs between 1.1 and
2.2 percent.22 Additionally, these decreases in trade deficiencies are not
only felt on a global scale. Indeed, for BRI country economies, the
change in shipment times and trade costs will range between 1.7 and
3.2 percent and 1.5 and 2.8 percent, respectively.23 Although these
changes are significant, the largest impacts will be felt in the countries
where corridors for the BRI are being constructed – shipment times
along these corridors have declined by up to 11.9 percent and trade
costs have declined by up to 10.2 percent.24 Although the immediate
effect of increasing infrastructure development through several
highways, ports, bridges, and railways have caused the most substantial
portion of the reduction in trade deficiencies, the study also states that
these effects are “magnified by policy reforms that reduce border
delays and improve corridor management.”25 As this highlights, the
changes the BRI facilitates are not merely infrastructural; the BRI also
reoriented political and international affairs.
Another World Bank study addressed whether an improved
transportation network would encourage more investment and,
subsequently, more economic growth. The study, conducted in late
2018, showed two primary findings in terms of investment.
First, the study showed that there is a significant correlation
between construction projects by Chinese firms in BRI countries and
increased direct investment.26 Specifically, according to the analysis
conducted, a 10% increase in China’s construction activities is
associated with an increase in outward foreign direct investment from

22

Id. For purposes of this study, “Trade Cost = Tariff + Transport + Time

Cost”
Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Maggie Chen and Chuanhao Lin, Foreign Investment Across the Belt and Road
– Patterns, Determinants and Effects, WORLD BANK GROUP (Oct. 10, 2018).
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/394671539175518256/pdf/WPS860
7.pdf.
23
24
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China of 7% in the same year, 11% the next year, and 16% in two
years.27 “This suggests that China’s infrastructure activities overseas
may serve as a catalyst for Chinese investments in manufacturing or
services.”28
Secondly, the research showed that an increase in foreign direct
investment resulting from reducing transportation costs can have a
positive effect on GDP, trade, and employment growth, especially for
lower-income countries.29 The results of the study were found by
exploring cross-country bilateral transportation cost and foreign
investment data. The research showed that the transportation
networks proposed in BRI countries can increase their GDP growth
by 0.09 percentage points. 30 These effects were found to vary by
region, with 0.01 percentage point growth in the Middle East and
North Africa, and 0.23 percentage point in Sub-Saharan Africa.31 The
research also showed that the BRI can actually have a spill-over effect
through their transportation networks, raising non-BRI Sub-Saharan
countries’ GDP growth by 0.13 percentage point.32
However, one of the points of emphasis in much of the early
research on the BRI has also pointed towards possible negative
implications stemming from BRI projects in certain countries. A study
conducted by the Center for Global Development has shown that
there are serious concerns about sovereign debt sustainability in eight
countries involved in BRI projects.33 These eight countries are
Djibouti, the Maldives, Laos, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, and Montenegro.34 In all of these countries, there is a high
risk of indebtedness due to the high ratio of loans to overall GDP. On
Id.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt
Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, CENTER FOR GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
PAPER,
(2018),
https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-androad-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.
34
Id.
27
28
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top of this, many of these countries are continuing, despite warnings
from international monetary groups, to incur debt over future projects
that they have invested in alongside China.35
In order to address issues in countries that are suffering from
debt distress over BRI-linked initiatives, the Chinese government has
seemed to provide debt relief in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner.36
Although many international groups have voiced concerns over the
debt distress being encumbered by many BRI countries, China has
“generally refrained from participating in multilateral approaches to
debt relief, though it does participate in debt relief discussions at the
international financial institutions and engages informally with IMF
[International Monetary Fund] staff on individual country cases.”37
The study notes that China is different from many other major official
creditors, who “actively participate in multilateral mechanisms dealing
with sovereign defaults, in particular the Paris Club.” 38 Without any
guiding framework to base China’s approach to debt sustainability
problems, countries “only have anecdotal evidence of ad hoc actions
taken by China as the basis for characterizing the country’s policy
approach.”39
However, despite the ad hoc approach taken by China, there
are signs that these practices may be changing, or at least giving way to
a more uniform approach. In November 2017, the China Banking
Regulatory Commission issued regulations, for the first time, for
China’s policy banks.40 These regulations emphasized “greater risk
controls for the overseas activities of The China Development Bank,
China Exim Bank, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China.41

Id. “Mongolia is in a particularly difficult position because its future
economic prosperity depends, in large part, on large infrastructure investments that
will increase productivity and facilitate exports.”
36
Id.
37
Id. at 19.
38
Id. at 19. NOTE – The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors
whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties
experienced by debtor countries.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, supra note 33.
35
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III. AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF FOUR BELT AND ROAD COUNTRIES
In order to show the varying degrees and intricacies of the BRI,
it is important to take a holistic view of the countries where the BRI
has been implemented. When analyzing a global initiative that is taking
place in over 65 different countries, in very diverse areas of the globe,
it would be foolish to try to paint in broad strokes. In order to avoid
this mistake, this comment will focus on four particular countries:
Kenya, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Montenegro. These countries were
selected due to each of their unique geographic locations, economic
positions, interactions with the BRI initiatives, and the observed and
speculated effects of the BRI within their borders. This comment will
first focus on Kenya, a country where, generally, the BRI has been
mostly embraced by the local government and population for the
benefits it has brought.
A. The Good with some Bad: Kenya
“They assure us they’re going to bring a lot of money with this
project . . . they assure us that they’re not crazy.”42 This sentiment is
being shared by the locals of Lamu, Kenya, where Chinese investment
in the area’s first coal-fired power plant is taking place.43 Projects like
the one in Lamu are indicative of Kenya, as a whole, working towards
attracting more foreign investment – and this is a need that China is
more than happy to fulfill through the BRI. In order to attract more
investment, Kenya needs electricity to power a large road-and-rail
project to connect its landlocked neighbors to a new port. 44 Cyrus
Kirima, the chief operating officer of the coal-powered plant,
expressed a common Kenyan sentiment regarding these foreign
investment infrastructure projects: “You need to do business . . . you
need investment.”45

42
Somini Segupta, Why build Kenya’s First Coal Plant? Hint: Think China, NEW
YORK
TIMES,
(Feb.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/climate/coal-kenya-china-power.html.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
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Although the coal plant project in Lamu is just a small example
of the investment projects taking place in Kenya through Chinese
actions, the feeling that development is needed is echoed across the
country. One of the largest BRI infrastructure projects that has taken
place in Kenya is the Standard Gauge Railway. The train currently runs
over 293 miles from Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, to the port city of
Mombasa, and it makes this trip twice a day.46 This railway is the largest
investment Kenya has made since its independence in 1963 at $3.8
billion for the first phase of the construction alone, which equaled
roughly six-percent of Kenya’s GDP.47 Over 90% of the funding for
the project came from China.48 However, on the Standard Gauge
Railway’s one-year anniversary in 2018, it appeared that expectations
had been exceeded. Original projections showed that the railway would
see its first 900,000 passengers by year five. However, by the end of its
first year the Standard Gauge Railway has already recorded its first
million passengers, and is currently seeing nearly five-thousand
passengers per day.49
The early success of the Standard Gauge Railway has been a
great source of optimism for those in Kenya’s government who see
foreign investment as a great way to continue to move the country
forward. “The SGR [Standard Gauge Railway] and the Belt and Road
Initiative are very important in the relationship between China and
Africa, and indeed between China and Kenya” stated Raphael Tuju,
the secretary general of Kenya’s ruling Jubilee Party.50 “It is key in the
sense that it opened the hinterland for trade, for ease of doing business

Eyder Peralta, A New Chinese-Funded Railway in Kenya Sparks Debt-Trap
Fears, NPR, (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/08/641625157/a-newchinese-funded-railway-in-kenya-sparks-debt-trap-fears.
47
CNN Staff, Kenya Marks the First Anniversary of the Standard Gauge Railway,
CNN,
(Jul.
16,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2018/07/16/marketplace-africa-kenyastandard-gauge-railway-vision-a.cnn.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Shi Yinglun, Kenya Reaps from Belt and Road Initiative Amid Infrastructure Boom:
Official, XINHUANET, (Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201808/29/c_137428736.htm.
46
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and I think if there is anything that underlines and brings out the
cooperation between China and Kenya, it is the SGR.” 51
This optimism is also shared by Kenya’s President, Uhuru
Kenyatta. Following Kenyatta’s meeting with Chinese President Xi at
the 2018 China-Africa summit in Beijing, Kenyatta voiced gratitude
towards China’s involvement in Kenya, and looked toward the future
of their involvement together.52 Specifically, President Kenyatta
stressed his view that Kenya should be moving on from the pure debtfinancing they had been using prior, principally with the Standard
Gauge Railway, toward a new emphasis on Public Private
Partnerships.53 Coincidentally, President Kenyatta has noted that the
priorities laid out for the next Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) align themselves well with what the Kenyan government has
called its “Big Four Agenda”: Manufacturing, Food Security &
Nutrition, Universal Health Care, and Affordable Housing.54 “Each of
these sectors offers viable investment opportunities. I therefore
welcome Chinese companies to invest in any of these priority areas.”55
It is no coincidence that President Kenyatta is looking to work
more with Public Private Partnerships as opposed to the debt financing
that was undertaken with the SGR. This is important to President
Kenyatta because, although Kenya has seen success with its
infrastructure investments, the debt on these investments still needs to
be paid.
Although the loans provided to the Kenyan government by the
Chinese Export-Import Bank did not give the appearance that they
were designed to be predatory,56 Kenya now owes $5.3 billion to China,
Id.
Official Press Release from the President of the Republic of Kenya, Big
Win for Kenya as Chinese Private Investors Line Up for Public Partnerships, (Sept. 4, 2018),
http://www.president.go.ke/2018/09/04/big-win-for-kenya-as-chinese-privateinvestors-line-up-for-public-partnerships/.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
China Exim Bank provided a $1.6 billion concessional loan and a
commercial loan of $1.633 billion for a total of $3.233 billion. The $1.6 billion
concessional loan is good for 20 years at a 2% interest rate and a payment period of
51
52
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and the reminders of this fact are ever-present on the railway. Most
notably, at the entrance of every single rail car, an image of the Kenyan
flag is flanked by an image of the Chinese flag.57 In August 2018,
Kenya’s public debt surpassed the five-trillion Kenyan Shilling mark,
equivalent to roughly $4.6 billion.58 Unsurprisingly, China accounts for
a large chunk of this public debt.
Many global analysts, such as the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales, have released reports that have
raised alarms over the accumulation of debt by Kenya, with the
ICAEW stating, “the pace of public debt accumulation and the lack of
a clear communication strategy regarding the government’s plan to
address deficits have raised concerns about the sustainability of
Kenya’s public finances.”59 Debt management is starting to become a
major issue for Kenya. John Mutua, a program officer at Kenya’s
Institute of Economic Affairs stated that, “Carrying more commercial
debt means interest payment will soon become our biggest challenge
in public debt management. Kenya’s official policy is to go for
concessional loans, but we haven’t managed that very well.”60
Although the Standard Gauge Railway, the first of potentially
many Chinese BRI projects in Kenya, has been seen mostly as a
success, there are certainly both optimistic and pessimistic views of
Kenya’s interaction with China. On one hand, Kenya has a new
transportation system thanks to Chinese investment, and revenues
from the system have already exceeded expectations. Therefore, more
Chinese investors are looking for more opportunities in the country.
13 years with a 7 year grace period (project #31777). The $1.633 billion preferential
concessional loan has a ‘interest rate of six months’ valid for 15 years with a payment
period of 10 and grace period of 5. See A. Dreher et al. (2017). Aid, China, and
Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. AidData
Working
Paper
#46.
Williamsburg,
VA:
AidData,
https://china.aiddata.org/projects/37103.
57
Peralta, supra note 46.
58
Angeline Mbogo, Kenya’s Public Debt Surpasses Sh5 Trillion Mark; 58% of
GDP,
THE
KENYAN
WALL
STREET,
(Aug.
30,
2018),
https://kenyanwallstreet.com/kenyas-public-debt-surpasses-sh5-trillion-mark-58of-gdp/.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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However, the potentially disastrous amount of debt that Kenya is
accumulating due to their dealings with China counterbalances the
aforementioned benefits. Additionally, reports have stated that
Chinese workers are not only taking over many of the principle
positions on the Standard Gauge Railway—jobs that were supposedly
to be reserved for native Kenyans—but local Kenyans are also facing
underemployment and discrimination. 61
Although China’s BRI projects in Kenya have had positive and
negative consequences, it can still be said that Kenya has gained more
than it has lost from its endeavors with China. However, not all
countries that take part in the BRI have had positive results that are
sufficient to justify the negative sideeffects and costs. As illustrated by
the following two countries, sometimes taking a gamble with China’s
BRI can end in unintended disaster.
B. Only the Bad: Sri Lanka & Malaysia
1. Sri Lanka
Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport was designed to
handle nearly a million passengers per year; it has also been called “The
World’s Emptiest [sic] International Airport.”62 This moniker was
given for good reason, because Mattala International Airport, despite
its capabilities, serves only a few dozen passengers per day.63 In fact,
the airport is so desperate for revenues that it has started renting out
its unused cargo terminals to store rice and other goods. 64 Even with
this unintended use of its cargo terminals, Mattala Airport only
manages to produce revenues of roughly $300,000 per year, which
does not begin to cover the $23.6 million per year, over eight years,

61
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repayment plan that Sri Lanka must follow.65 On the receiving end of
the repayment plan is China.
As disastrous as business for the airport has been, it is
unfortunately only one of multiple bad investments made by Sri Lanka
as a result of the BRI. In addition to the Mattala Airport, Sri Lanka also
has a seldom used $1.5 billion deep-water port that was built and
financed by the Chinese.66 Both of these infrastructure investments
came through the BRI, but how did they become such disasters for the
Sri Lankan government?
Following a decades long civil war, the Sri Lankan government,
headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa, determined that the country’s
only airport, located in the largest Sri Lankan city of Colombo, was
beginning to receive too much traffic and that a second airport needed
to be built.67 Unfortunately, the government decided to develop the
airport, and other infrastructure projects, in a very underdeveloped
area of Sri Lanka, Hambantota – the home region of then president
Mahinda Rajapaksa. 68 Rajapaksa was hoping to make the development
of the Hambantota region the crowning achievement of his regime –
a fact that was highlighted by the decision to name the airport, deepwater port, and international cricket stadium after President
Rajapaksa.69
Coming out of a long and expensive civil war, the Sri Lankan
government had to look to outside funding for these projects. At the
time, Sri Lanka had poor relations with Western powers, including the
United States and European Union, due to alleged war crimes
committed by the Rajapaksa regime that resulted in both the United
States and European Union turning off economic aid and
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concessions.70 Thus, Sri Lanka looked to another large foreign
economy to help fund its infrastructure projects. China, ever eager to
seize an opportunity to export some of its industrial capacities, obliged.
In the form of a loan, China supplied $190 million of the $210 million
building cost for the Mattala International Airport. 71 The Rajapaksa
regime’s aspirations did not stop with the Mattala Airport. Chinese
funding was then sought for a $1.4 billion multi-stage deep sea port, a
world-class cricket stadium, and new highways to connect all of the
projects.72
For China, Sri Lanka’s geographic location, situated in the Bay
of Bengal to China’s south, is perfect for a port in its maritime BRI.
Such an island port would be perfect in the so-called “String of Pearls”
of ports and islands that China could use for trade and other
geopolitical activities in the Indian Ocean and surrounding area.73
Indeed, there are common themes present in both the “String of
Pearls” theory, and the maritime aspirations of the BRI, such as a wish
for establishing key ports, infrastructure development programs, and
collaboration with regional governments.74 Thus, Chinese motivations
to gain an interest in Sri Lanka, and its new desire for a deep sea port,
served both its BRI aspirations and possible geopolitical goals equally.
With such a large amount of loans being issued to Sri Lanka
from China, there were fears that Sri Lanka may default. This
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culminated in Rajapaksa suffering a presidential election defeat at the
hands of Maithripala Sirisena, who during the campaign actively drew
attention to the idea that Rajapaksa was selling Sri Lanka’s future to
the Chinese through these expensive infrastructure loans. 75
Rajapaksa’s ambitions to revitalize the Hambantota region of
Sri Lanka failed, and when the new Sirisena regime took control of the
Sri Lanka government, its options for dealing with the loans were
limited. While the government tried to reexamine the deals made with
China, and halted construction on the deep sea port, nearly 95% of Sri
Lanka’s revenues were going towards servicing its foreign debt.76
Ultimately, Sri Lanka handed over the Hambantota Deep Sea Port to
China in a deal that gave China 70% equity in the port and a 99-year
lease deal.77 Mismanagement of government funds following these
massive investments with China has led to a debt-crisis in Sri Lanka
that has gotten so bad that the Auditor General, in February 2018,
could not state with certainty how much public debt the country
owed.78
The case of Sri Lanka is an example of what can happen if a
country is not diligent and disciplined in its dealings with China and
their BRI. Their investments can backfire, and result in not only
massive public debt, but the surrender of resources to the Chinese.
Although it can be argued that Sri Lanka lacked sufficient caution and
scrutiny, the same cannot be said about another country in Southeast
Asia.
2. Malaysia
Malaysia, a prosperous Southeast Asian country, appears to
have seen the writing on the wall when it came to its investment
projects with China’s BRI. In fact, during his general election campaign
in 2018, newly elected prime minister Mahathir Mohamad emphasized
Shepard, supra note 67.
Jonathan Hillman, Game of Loans: How China Bought Hambantota, CENTER
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(Apr.
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the charges of corruption levied against his predecessor, Najib Razak.79
Former Prime Minister Razak had been formally accused of corruption
and money laundering in connection with the Malaysia Development
Berhad, a Malaysian strategic development company. It is believed that
the Malaysian Development Berhad may have been the recipient of
Chinese funds that were illegally taken from two pipeline projects that
were being undertaken by Razak’s regime.80
This is why since taking office Mohamad has tried to devise a
way to undo the damage that his predecessor had done in his dealings
with China and the BRI. Upon taking office, Mohamad stated publicly
that due to Razak entering Malaysia into lopsided deals with no exit
clauses with China, Malaysia is now desperately trying to avoid
financial ruin.81 “I believe China does not want to see Malaysia become
a bankrupt country . . . if we have to pay compensation, we have to
pay . . . we must find a way to exit these projects . . . this is our own
people’s stupidity.”82
Since taking office, Prime Minister Mohamed has suspended
three major Chinese-backed BRI projects.83 The Malaysian Finance
Minister, Lim Guan Eng, stated that the government ordered the
suspension of two pipeline deals in addition to a railway that, all
together, were worth $22.35 billion.84 Malaysia’s deals with China will
continue to be under the tight scrutiny of Prime Minister Mohamed,
79
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who will continue to review any deals that may be seen as dubious in
nature.85 Prime Minister Mohamed has been quite blunt about
Malaysia’s interactions with China since assuming office, stating that
Malaysia would only be pursuing “fair trade” with China, and has
publicly warned about a possible new version of colonialism. This was
seen as a reference to China’s dealings with other countries leading to
massive amounts of debt for the host nation. This would then result
in countries becoming more beholden to China’s will in order to relieve
their debt.86
From the eyes of many financial experts, it would make sense
that Prime Minister Mohamed would pull out of the three major BRI
projects with China, given that the Malaysian national debt is estimated
to be $252 billion, or roughly 65% of the country’s GDP. 87 However,
although Prime Minister Mohamed has been publicly critical of China
in its dealings with Malaysia, he has not been hesitant to heap blame
on his predecessor, Razak:
“It is not about the Chinese, it is about the Malaysian
government. They borrowed huge sums of money and now we have
problems trying to repay the money that they have owed . . . That is
Malaysians playing around with money, not even doing proper
feasibility studies and due diligence before going into business.”88
However, Prime Minster Mohamed has eased his criticism of
China, and this may be because of the strong economic relationship
Malaysia has with China. Malaysia’s largest trading partner is China,
and a large chunk of Malaysia’s population have livelihoods that are at
least partly reliant on Chinese investment and good diplomatic and
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economic ties between the two countries.89 This puts Malaysia in a very
tricky position when dealing with Chinese investment and BRI
opportunities – both politically and economically.
Malaysia’s unique situation with China has drawn the attention
of many in the international community. Many are wondering where
the relationship will go with the new administration under Prime
Minister Mohamed, and what these setbacks spell for China’s BRI
aspirations in Southeast Asia. Yun Sun, director of the China Program
at the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think-tank, has speculated about
the implications for both sides following the setbacks over the past few
years.90
Sun believes that China has attributed the cancellation of the
three major BRI projects in Malaysia to Malaysia’s current state of
domestic politics. This belief also serves to disregard the liabilities
associated with the three BRI projects – such as their many
irregularities and their unviable nature, in many aspects. 91 Sun sees the
current state of affairs as a cooling period between the two countries
as Malaysia’s new regime settles in. Prime Minster Mohamed does not
necessarily want to antagonize China with his current foreign policy
decisions, but is aiming to strengthen economic ties that would yield
more comprehensive benefits to Malaysia.92 Sun has stated that Prime
Minister Mohamed’s recent visit to China “indicated his strong
interests in industrial, technological and trade cooperation, but this is
significantly different from cooperation based on infrastructure
projects that are funded and built by China, the key priority of its Belt
and Road Initiative.”93
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However, one of the key implications that China is focused on,
because of its recent setbacks with Malaysia, is the escalation of
concern coming from Southeast Asia. Sun agrees with the notion that
most Southeast Asian nations, both those on Asia’s mainland and the
island nations, are having growing concerns over China’s rapid growth
in influence in the area as a result of their aggressive financial
endeavors.94 This fear is highlighted by the fact that China’s BRI
projects in this region are heavily involved with financing – and not
investment. China actually ranks fifth in terms of foreign direct
investment in Southeast Asia – the bulk of China’s involvement in
Southeast Asia is in the form of commercial and concessional loans
that other nations will eventually have to pay back to China. 95 Thus,
due to the failings of Sri Lanka, countries like Malaysia are now trying
to slow down Chinese financing in the region, and sounding the alarm
to other countries doing business with China and its BRI. Sun
concludes that although individual countries, like Malaysia, are able to
pull back a bit on Chinese investment in the area, the greater trend
upward of Chinese investment in the area is unlikely to change anytime
soon. This leaves Sri Lanka and Malaysia as cautionary tales for other
nations.96
C. The Questionable: Montenegro
“Their fiscal space has shrunk enormously. They have strangled
themselves. And for the time being this is a highway to nowhere.”97
Situated in Southeastern Europe, on the shore of the Adriatic
Sea, is the small Balkan country of Montenegro, a country that only
gained its formal independence from Serbia in 2006, dissolving the last
of what used to be Yugoslavia.98 In this Balkan nation, one of the last
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things you would expect to see is the large and pronounced presence
of China – but through its BRI initiative, China has now poured
millions of dollars and thousands of its own workers into
Montenegro.99 The large Chinese presence stems from the wish of the
Montenegro government to expand the country’s ability to connect its
port city of Bar, to the city of Boljare in the landlocked nation of Serbia
on Montenegro’s northeastern border.100 Montenegro will seek to
connect these two key cities through the construction of a 103 mile
highway, the Bar-Boljare Highway, equipped with tunnels and bridges
to navigate the mountainous terrain contained within Montenegro. 101
In order to take on such an ambitious project, Montenegro, a
country that is ranked 161 out of 230 countries in terms of GDP
(purchasing power parity), needed outside financing.102 Western
financial institutions were not interested in investing in Montenegro.
In fact, two feasibility studies, one carried out by the French firm Louis
Berger and the second by the American company URS both concluded
that there would not be enough traffic on the highway to justify its
construction.103 “The low current traffic volumes and the weak
economic forecasts mean that the economic benefits of the proposed
route do not provide adequate return on the investment” stated URS
in its assessment.104
Nonetheless, China was willing to aid in Montenegro’s push
for improved infrastructure. In order to fund just the first 41
kilometers of the highway, the first phase of construction, Montenegro
needed to borrow nearly 809 million euros from China, which nearly
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equates to one-fifth of Montenegro’s entire GDP.105 This amount has
sent Montenegro’s debt soaring, and has forced the government to
take drastic measures such as raising taxes, partially freezing public
sector wages, and ending a tax benefit for mothers.106 In addition, the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) stated that Montenegro cannot
afford to take on anymore debt in order to complete the entire
ambitious project.107 The IMF bluntly stated in its report that “fiscal
space does not exist to finance the remaining phases of the highway
with debt” even though it is likely the highway will cost an additional
one billion dollars.108
In addition to the 809 million euros Montenegro received from
China’s state-funded Export-Import Bank, a loan which covers
roughly 85% of the cost of the first section of the Bar-Boljare
Highway, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (“CRBC”), a
Chinese state-owned company, will be undertaking nearly 70% of the
work.109 CRBC was also able to include in its deal with the Montenegro
government that all of its imported construction materials, equipment,
and other goods would not be subject to customs and taxation. 110
These two conditions represent an unfortunate loss of revenue for
Montenegro in its own infrastructure endeavor – both for the potential
it could have had for local laborers and for the potential gain in tax
revenue. Also under the current contract is the stipulation that an
arbitration court in China would have jurisdiction in the event of any
potential legal dispute.111 These favorable terms have increased the
confidence of Chinese workers, with Kang Shifei, deputy project
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manager for CRBC, stating that “CRBC expects to build the future
sections of this project.”112
To make matters more uncertain for Montenegro, the
government did not hedge against currency swings, and forgot to
include a key turnpike in the original blueprint for the highway, which
has only exacerbated their current debt problems. 113 This puts
Montenegro is a precarious position, a position that can leave them
vulnerable to the political will of China. Montenegro will have to pay
back the Chinese loan, at two-percent interest, between the years 2020
and 2040 after an initial five-year grace period.114 Most surpringly, in
the event of Montenegro defaulting on the loan, China would be able
to seize parts of Montenegro’s territory.115
Given the terms and risks of the agreement, Vatroslav Belan,
Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister of Montenegro, stated that, “this
highway is not a Chinese investment. This is the investment of the
government of Montenegro. We are taking the risk, that is the
difference.”116 However, Belan does stress the positive outlook the
Montenegrin government has on the infrastructure project, stating
“[through] the growth of the economy, which will be grown thanks to
the highway, we will earn enough money to pay for the highway.”117
Montenegro’s Prime Minister, Duski Markovic, has stated that the
highway will be completed at any cost, and he has characterized those
who have dismissed the feasibility of the project as “disbelievers.”118
Many in Montenegro, as well as international bodies outside of
Montenegro, have concern about where the all of the debt can lead the
country. Jelisava Kalezić, a former Professor of Civil Engineering at
the University of Montenegro, understands the need for a major
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highway in Montenegro, but believes that the highway would have
been a well-received infrastructure project in “2002 or 2003, when our
economy was in a much better state” and Montenegro was not
threatened with bankruptcy.119 Mladen Grgic, a China/Balkans expert
from U.C. Berkeley, stated that, to the people of Montenegro, the
highway is a big deal, and it reminds the people of “the days of grand
socialist projects in the region.”120 However, despite the fond feelings
felt by some of the population of Montenegro, Grgic warns that the
highway is beginning to resemble a trap. “Now that it’s been started,
the politicians can’t stop it – no matter how harmful it might be. And
frankly, they don’t want to.”121 Due to the high levels of debt and the
uncertain timeline surrounding the completion of the Bar-Boljare
Highway, Montenegro’s future, and its relationship with China as its
creditor and partner, remains uncertain.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE BELT AND ROAD
INITIATIVE

As China has unveiled and implemented its BRI over the past
six years, the international community has been watching closely in
order to monitor the progress of the initiative. While watching the
initiative’s progress, the international community has been weighing
the pros and cons of the project as it relates to international affairs and
the interests of individual countries. In the eyes of the international
community, China is doing more than investing in foreign
governments and creating opportunities for its state-owned companies
and banks - it is also leveraging and enhancing its geopolitical position.
Although Chinese officials claim that their involvement in developing
nations is entirely benign in terms of geopolitical aspirations, and it is
just an example of their “win-win cooperation,” many nations are
skeptical of the BRI’s overall motivation. 122
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One of the more perplexing issues with China’s interactions
with nations willing to participate in the BRI is China’s ad hoc
approach to settling issues of debt.123 The international community,
and the countries that are dealing with the BRI, share concerns over
China’s willingness to, at times, write off or restructure debt and extend
further lines of credit, but at other times to solely seek the assets of
nations in order to service the loans.124 In a study conducted by the
Center for Global Development, the conclusion was that “without a
guiding multilateral or other framework to define China’s approach to
debt sustainability problems, we only have anecdotal evidence of ad
hoc actions taken by China as the basis for characterizing the country’s
policy approach.”125
One international body that has particular concerns with
China’s approach to sovereign debt is the Paris Club. The role of the
Paris Club is to find “coordinated and sustainable solutions to the
payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries.”126 The Paris
Club is comprised of 22 countries that have a “large exposure to other
States worldwide;” China is not a full member of the Paris Club, but
participates on an ad hoc basis.127 As an ad hoc member, China is free
to withdraw from discussions or participation at any time and is invited
on a case-by-case basis to join on a country-specific discussion, which
is based on a signaled interest in specific countries and issues.128 China
has shied away from multilateral approaches to debt relief aside from
its informal participation with the Paris Club and the International
Monetary Fund.129 This stands in contrast to many other official
creditors, all of whom actively participate in multilateral mechanisms,
especially the Paris Club. 130 The international community believes it
would be in their best interest if China, as they continue to increase
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their status as an international creditor, were to decide to fully
participate in the Paris Club and end their history of non-transparent
credit activities. 131
China’s ambitions with the BRI have also drawn backlash from
its main competitor nations in terms of foreign investment – including
the United States, India, and Japan.132 Although these countries are
unable to match Chinese investment in the region, they are attempting
to stymie Chinese influence with their own influence. The United
States recently passed the BUILD Act in October 2018, which created
an International Development Finance Corporation with $60 billion
to lend.133 Japan has increased its lending in Southeast Asia in response
to the BRI.134 India has sought to have greater diplomatic influence
over its surrounding region, which had successfully swayed Bangladesh
to pass on a Chinese BRI initiative to develop a deep-water port for
the nation.135 These efforts can prove to be a large detriment to the
BRI.
The United States, known for its large international influence,
has been particularly skeptical of China’s BRI. Alarmed by the
potential for corruption, and the vulnerability of some nations’
sovereignty to Chinese investment, Vice President Mike Pence
announced the new Indo-Pacific Transparency Initiative.136 The
initiative is funded with more than $400 million, with the aim to
“empower the region’s citizens, combat corruption, and strengthen
sovereignty.”137 The United States has also joined Japan and Australia
in a trilateral partnership which was formed in order to “mobilize
investment in projects that drive economic growth, create
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opportunities, and foster a free, open, inclusive and prosperous IndoPacific.”138 The trilateral initiative is widely seen as a broader effort to
reassert influence in the Pacific during a time that China is increasing
its diplomatic pressure in the area through the BRI. 139 This new
strategy involves the use of $133 million in new technology, energy and
infrastructure initiatives in Asia, which is all a part of President
Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy.140 Ideally, through the trilateral
initiative, the United States, Japan, and Australia would be able to
provide high-quality alternatives to BRI loans issued by China.141
Along with economic and diplomatic concerns from the
international community about the BRI, there have also been growing
military concerns about the influence of China and the BRI.
Throughout China’s building of infrastructure projects in Southeast
Asia there have been concerns about the possible military implications
of the endeavors, but these suspicions did not have much factual basis
behind them. That was until the first explicitly military component was
added to the Maritime portion of the BRI in the form of a base in
Djibouti which was constructed with the goal of providing support for
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).142 From that point
forward, the Pentagon’s suspicion has only heightened. It was revealed
in 2018 that the Pakistani Air Force and Chinese officials had
completed a secret proposal to have Pakistan build Chinese military
jets, weaponry and other hardware with all of these military projects
being designated as part of China’s BRI. 143 With its plan in Pakistan,
China is now explicitly tying a BRI proposal to military purposes. The
United States had thought that after suspending billions of dollars in
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security aid to Pakistan in early 2018 that it would cause Pakistan to
increase its cooperation with the United States.144 However, it appears
that it has only caused Pakistan to find a new source of security aid in
China.
The deep-water port constructed by the Chinese in the
Pakistani port city of Gwadar was originally built with trade and
economic concerns in mind – giving both the Chinese and Pakistanis
a quicker route to access the Arabian Sea.145 However, now that the
military implications of the BRI have come more into focus, many are
now seeing the strategic advantage the port can give to China to play
against the United States and India if the tensions in the area were to
worsen to the point of naval blockades.146 In fact, Pakistan as a whole
has a multitude of military benefits for China to explore: “shared
borders and a long history of cooperation; a hedge in South Asia
against India; a large market for arms sales and trade with potential for
growth; a wealth of natural resources.”147 Moreover, military experts
have predicted that China will use the deep-sea port at Gwadar to
expand upon its naval fleet, after selling eight submarines to Pakistan
for $6 billion; the Chinese could then use the equipment it sells to
Pakistan in order to refuel its own submarines in the port. 148 Vice
President Pence made his thoughts on the potential military
implications of China’s building of ports in foreign nations heard in
his October 2018 speech at the Hudson Institute:
China uses so-called debt diplomacy to expand its
influence . . . Just ask Sri Lanka, which took on massive
debt to let Chinese state companies build a port of
questionable commercial value. Two years ago, that
country could no longer afford its payments, so Beijing
pressured Sri Lanka to deliver the new port directly
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into Chinese hands. It may soon become a forward
military base for China’s growing blue-water navy.149
It appears that the security and military implications have been
known by those in the international community who have been
watching the development of the BRI. “Most people working in
military circles knew there was a security dimension to [the BRI] so
this [New York Times report] is just a confirmation at best,” said James
Chin, director of the Asia Institute at the University of Tasmania.150
Chin added that it is often very difficult, near impossible, for a country
to separate military power and economic power when they are in the
process of striving for greatness.151 However, despite the military
implications of the BRI, Chin also agrees that “in the end, BRI could
end up as a logistical route to sell China-made stuff and nothing
else.”152
V. CONCLUSION
“The future is coming now; the Belt and Road is how.” 153
Although the sentiments the BRI may invoke vary across
different nations and people, the one fact that is not disputed is the
high level of innovation, and the huge impact the BRI is having on the
world in only six years. The trillion-dollar development deal has grown
to 118 participant nations at the close of 2018.154 The total value of
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BRI construction projects has reached $380 billion, while investments
in the projects stand at $180 billion.155
As seen from the analysis of several countries throughout this
comment, the effects of the BRI on nations with different
backgrounds and economic conditions can vary from good, to bad, to
dubious. In Kenya, there is reason for both optimism and caution as
the SGR has exceeded expectations. Yet, this has the Kenyan
government searching for a way to service their growing debt to China.
The nations of Sri Lanka and Malaysia are both backed into a
precarious corner with their dealings with China’s BRI and are looking
to dig themselves out of bad financial decisions that have left their
countries in a hole of debt. Montenegro is situated at the peak of a
growing mountain of debt over its Bar-Boljare highway, and the
coming decisions made by the Montenegrin government will decide
whether the country will be able to sustain itself or fall deeper into
debt.
Developing nations will more often than not need creditors
and prosperous nations to aid them with funding in order to grow their
economies. However, the methods and rationales behind the funds
being invested in these nations must always be analyzed by the
international community. Although China has stated repeatedly that
the BRI is an initiative that is only interested in win-win transactions
with developing nations, some of the results of their initiative have
caused those countries, and others in the international community, to
be skeptical of China’s investment strategies and possible ulterior
motives.
The international community, as well as international monetary
groups, should exercise caution in the degree of oversight they provide
over China’s BRI. Although the BRI can have a positive impact on the
regions it is involved in, it will not excuse the international community
from giving its due diligence. Additionally, countries that wish to host
BRI projects should explore their options for creditors, including
getting the recommendation of the Paris Club or other international
crediting organizations. If countries wish to proceed with China in a
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BRI project, they should make sure the terms of the agreement are not
only clear, but not lopsided in China’s favor to a degree that would
endanger the future of the nation’s economy. In all likelihood, the BRI
is a project that will be around for decades to come, and along with it
will come a mix of prosperity and peril – the exact ratio of this mixture
is an answer that will only come with time.
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